We analyse the effect of dual-class structures on shareholder value of Swiss companies. Switzerland presents an ideal setting for studying the deviations from the one share-one vote rule due to the traditional popularity of multiple share classes. After accounting for self-selection into dual or single share category, we find strong positive effect of dual-class shares on firm value. Analysis of acquisition activities reveals that dual-class firms do not perform worse in acquisitions; contrary to that, in the recent years or among firms with low and moderate market-to-book values the returns to acquisitions are improved due to the dual-class structure.
the effect of the dual-class structure itself.
In order to understand the economic channel of a possible value loss effect in dual-class firms, we can refer to the papers analyzing the extraction of private benefits by insiders with superior voting rights. Numerous papers on tunneling provide such evidence on by describing the tunneling of resources from corporations in several countries. If a controlling shareholder has disproportionate control rights that exceed cash flow rights, the deprivation of value is often assured in environments with weak legal systems. at the London Stock Exchange. We must recognize that the decision to abolish the dual share structure -much like any other capital structure decision -is highly endogenous in that the decision-makers can strategically choose the moment to change the equity structure. They may choose to reorganize when the stock price reaction is expected to be most appreciative of the announcement. Moreover, in many cases the abolition of dual shares is a result of tensions between holders of superior and inferior shares, and the overall focus is on redistribution of control among insiders, while average wealth effect may be quite small.
We proceed with describing the peculiarities of the Swiss market and relevant regulations in Section 2. Then we develop our hypotheses in Section 3 and describe our data sample in Section 4. We report our results on valuation in Section 5 and the analysis of acquisition activities in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Swiss regulatory background
To understand why the Swiss environment can be fairly different, it is instructive to analyze the regulatory background of the Swiss corporate milieu. In the early 90s, the total assets of all dual-class firms were twice as large as the total assets of all single share firms. If there would appear to be notably more incidences of any sort of abuse related to misrepresentation and misreporting in dual-class firms, a natural equilibrium outcome would be that the regulators and market community would call upon the introduction of more stringent regulation and transparent corporate practices. Local corporate standards indeed experienced far-reaching advancements in the direction of more transparent and demanding rules, so that the contemporary Swiss requirements to listed companies are close to be as strict as the requirements 6 in the U.S. 1 Back in the beginning of the 90s, corporate executives and insiders could enjoy a fairly high level of freedom in accounting and reporting to shareholders and the market community. Before several important amendments were made to the Swiss Code of Obligations in the early 90s (accepted in 1992, mandatory for banks and financial companies from 1994 and for listed companies from 1996), there were the following weaknesses 2 in requirements to public corporations: 1. Swiss firms had an opportunity not to report their hidden cash reserves and thus could smooth their performance results over different years or spend that cash on discretionary projects of the managers, a practice that was shown to frequently harm the shareholder value.
2. Own shares didn't have to be reported, nor was it necessary to create a reserve for holdings of own shares.
3. The aggregation of financial statements of companies within a holding firm into consolidated accounts was not required; only the accounts of the controlling company were reported, thus the real business situation within a group of companies could have stayed unknown to the shareholders and often even to the board. 4 . Crosswise set-off and pre netting of foreign currency liabilities were allowed.
5. Notes to the annual accounts were not required, so they were not used in common practice.
These flaws in regulation indisputably gave corporate insiders broad freedoms to misrepresent performance and manipulate accounting data, potentially endangering the interests of outside shareholders. AluSuisse and Von Roll were examples of companies that were reporting sound finances while concealing actual losses using hidden 1 Swiss listed companies are obliged to comply with IFRS or U.S. GAAP -much the same requirement as in the U.S. Yet, Swiss unlisted companies still enjoy fair amount of freedom, e.g., hidden reserves are still allowed and often used in case of unlisted companies, a practice which is prohibited in U.S. and international rules (according to the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law in Lausanne).
2 See Peter Böckli, Schweizer Aktienrecht, 4. Aufl., Zürich 2009, §8 N 24-28.
predominantly in firms with dual shares.
The lower initial transparency of Swiss corporations and the concentrated control resulting from dual-class structures were probably important triggers that provoked increased public attention and regulatory strictness on the Swiss market place. The dual structure has been heavily criticized since at least the 1930s; in 1936 the ban on dual class was the subject of the Swiss Nationalrat's (part of the Swiss Parliament) debate, 4 and then again in 1991 (yet, in both cases the Parliament decided to keep this option for Swiss firms). As possibly an economic substitute for a potential ban of dual-class shares, the debate on the necessity of increased corporate transparency intensified in the early 90s: there were several votes in both parts of the Parliament regarding this issue, and while the majority supported increased transparency for public firms, there was a disagreement regarding the rules for non-listed firms. 5 The financial market regulation has experienced numerous improvements since then, most notably the enacting of the True and Fair View principle 6 and the introduction of more modern and stringent accounting rules in the Swiss Code of Oblig- Furthermore, as Burkart and Lee (2008) argue, reallocation of effective control from insiders (concentrated holdings of dual shares) to managers (dispersed shareholder ownership) can actually exacerbate the associated agency problems. In particular, executives' incentives can be even more disconnected from value creation than those of insiders, who still hold substantial cash flow rights (albeit in a lesser amount than control rights) and often have a psychological connection to the fortune of the controlled company. Furthermore, the dual structure helps to overcome low diversification of insiders' personal wealth: with lower capital share in the firm insiders have better diversified portfolios, and thus closer risk-taking incentives with an outsider shareholder, who is free to broadly diversify the firm-specific risk in her portfolio.
We can formally split the positive and negative effects mentioned above into two economic channels. We let channel (A) aggregate the positive influence of concentrated control resulting from dual shares. We can list here the commitment to the Hypothesis H1: The net effect of dual-class ownership on the market-to-book value of equity is positive.
Hypothesis H2: The dual-class structure positively affects the outcomes of acquisitions as measured by the abnormal return at announcement.
Presumably, we expect the variation in the magnitude of the net effect to differ across countries, depending on the quality of legal enforcement and investor protection, the value of reputation and discount factors. For example, the two mentioned studies on tunneling practices analyzed Mainland China and India, two environments in which both investor protection provisions and the value of reputation in repeated interactions are supposedly lower than in Switzerland, so we expect the net effect of dual shares to be on average higher (more positive or less negative) in countries like
Switzerland than in those two markets. In section 5 we test the influence of dual shares on firm valuation, by constructing least squares regression in part 5.1 and also by taking into account that the choice of the share structure is an endogenous decision in part 5.2. In section 6 we evaluate how the quality of acquisitions measured by announcement return differs among dual and single-class firms. Our results show that in the Swiss market the net effect of dual shares is positive for firm valuation, not negative for acquisition returns and in fact is significantly positive in the second part of our sample, as well as among firms with low and moderate market-to-book values.
Data description
For our regression analysis, we start with all firms (excluding cantonal banks) that equals one if the company name contains any surname or family name). Second, the share of firms that concurrently have a dual-class structure (in a firm's broadly defined industry) is used as an exogenous predictor of having a dual structure. We also studied the history of each firm in our sample to collect the variable age, where we followed the principle of sticking to the establishment year of the company described as the "core" enterprise if there were mergers or acquisitions with name changes. 17 In fact, many firms used to have three classes of stocks before the 90s. Besides bearer and registered shares, participation certificates were often used (and continue to exist at some firms) as an extreme case of cash flow-and voting rights separation. We classify the firm as having dual class if it has more than one class of shares. 18 The guide is published yearly by the leading Swiss financial newspaper "Finanz und Wirtschaft" not have an impact on the efficiency of a firm, other than potentially influencing the decision of insiders (in this case, a family related to that name) to retain the control of the company via the dual share capital structure. In other words, this variable is exogenous to firm value, besides its influence on the valuation channeled through the incidence of having the dual-class structure.
Similarly, the firm age variable is linked to the decision to keep the firm under tight control using the dual-class structure, where the relation is hypothesized to be negative. As a firm becomes more mature, it also tends to have a weaker link with its initial creators simply due to the natural passage of time, as younger generations of owners will arguably have a diminished psychological attachment to the firm their ancestors established or used to own. At the same time, we expect the age to have little influence on the firm value, once the industry effect, profitability and share of industry sales are taken into account. As the OLS estimation results further show, age has indeed insignificant influence on the firm valuation in a multivariate regression setting, which gives further validity to the exclusion argument.
To address the second hypothesis on the efficiency of acquisition practices, we 21 Insiders classified as influential if a manager or board member holds at least 20% of voting control (family shareholdings were also treated as being controlled by the insider). 22 Another variable often used to instrument for dual-class structure, media dummy, was not employed in our study, as no company in our sample can be classified as belonging to media sector (using SIC codes as in Gompers et al). [Insert Table 1 Here]
To test whether the announcement return differs for dual and single-class firms,
we employ the raw cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the date of the acquisition announcement as a dependent variable. 23 The abnormal return is customary computed as a sum of stock returns in excess of the SMI index -over five days, starting with the return two trading day prior to the announcement.
We report the descriptive statistics in Table 1 . Over the entire sample period, dual class firms are on average significantly smaller in size and industry share of sales, have somewhat smaller past sales growth (although the difference is insignificant), higher asset turnover and return on assets. The means of leverage (defined as long-term debt and current portion of long-term debt over assets) are similar, but single-class firms have notably higher long-term debt portion in their capital structure, which is explained by significantly higher short-term debt over assets ratio in dual-class firms. Industry-adjusted cash holdings and R&D expenditures are significantly lower at dual-class firms, while capital expenditures ratios and dividend payout do not differ significantly. These features hint at importance of industry and business structure for the choice of dual share structure. Single-class firms are on average five years younger and as expected have on average 10% less of closely held voting shares in their equity structure. Finally, abnormal returns at acquisitions are insignificantly higher for dual-class firms, which will be the focus of detailed analysis in section six.
We proceed with reporting the results of testing our hypotheses in the next two sections.
Estimating the impact of dual-class on firm valuation
We investigate the impact that the dual class structure has on a firm valuation, defined as market value of firm equity relative to its book value. We employ two versions of estimation: the baseline Ordinary Least Squares and the estimation that accounts for the sample-selection, the treatment effect Heckman model. The former implicitly assumes that the dual class structure is randomly allocated to different firms in the sample. Such an assumption regarding an important choice variable is commonly not valid in any social sciences setting, neither is it sufficiently sound in our case of choosing a capital structure, and thus the estimated coefficient has merely a descriptive interpretation of the association between firm value and the fact of having a dual structure. The OLS estimates cannot be interpreted as a causal relation (or as an impact of introducing a dual structure in a given firm onto the valuation).
Such a conclusion would disregard the inherited differences that make some types of firms more inclined to adopt a dual-class structure than others. 24 Conversely, Heckman Treatment Effect estimation regression treats the choice of dual-class share as an endogenous choice variable, which is determined by firm-specific and industryspecific time-varying variables. In this case, the estimated coefficient of the dual-class dummy has a causal meaning: it quantifies the effect of having a dual-class structure on firm value.
Dual-class and valuation: OLS regression results
In the baseline regression, the dependent variable is market-to-book value of equity at the end of the accounting year. The explanatory variable of interest is the dummy of the dual-class. If the dual-class is abolished in a given year, we classify the firm as having unified shares in the respective year, for the anticipated effect of changes are likely to be incorporated into the year-end valuation. We employ the usual control variables to isolate the effect of firm-specific characteristics: leverage to capture the 24 Yet, in numerous corporate finance studies simple OLS-type regressions were prevalent until about one and a half decade ago. Not surprisingly policymakers and mass media also used simple performance comparisons between frequently incomparable groups of companies to yield policy recommendations or criticize various corporate actions, including the dual class shares. Progressively, the last two decades witnessed the widespread use of techniques that adjust for selection, which allows us to aim at documenting more accurate effect of the capital structure of our interest.
disciplining effect that periodic interest payments extend upon management, natural logarithm of assets to control for the firm size, share of industry sales to capture relative size on the market, earnings and assets turnover to capture efficiency, and age to control for maturity. The inclusion of these variables controls for the systematic differences in these dimensions and helps to estimate the clean OLS estimate for the dual class dummy. However, we should note that it does not solve the problem of the sample selection into dual vs. single-class, which is addressed in the next subsection.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
As presented in Table 2 , the coefficient of the dual class dummy has a negative and significant estimate in the OLS regression indicating a negative correlation between a dual-class share structure and the firm value. As we discussed above, the coefficient from this regression should not be interpreted causally, and the underlying economic
relation is yet to be estimated in a Heckman selection model. For now we conclude that firms that have dual-class also tend to be valued less.
Cash holdings relative to industry average have a positive relation with the valuation, which either demonstrates that stronger and more successful firms (with higher valuations) accumulate more cash from operations, or that the market perceives large cash holdings as a competitive advantage and a means to expand the market share.
The latter explanation is in line with Fresard (2009), who finds that cash reserves allow firms to gain market share and succeed in a product market competition. However, this contrasts with a more traditional view that cash is used for discretionary purposes of management rather than for shareholder value maximization.
Coefficients on other variables have an intuitive interpretation. Leverage has a positive but insignificant effect on equity value, which seems to reflect the net effect of the main consequences of having higher leverage: the positive influence of financial discipline imposed on corporate management and the negative influence of potential distress costs due to higher risk of a leveraged firm. It may also reflect the tendency that higher leverage is observed in more mature firms that have more assets in place (that helps to take higher debt level using assets as collateral) and at the same time less growth opportunities, and thus a lower market-to-book value.
Larger firms (more assets) tend to have a lower valuation per dollar of book value; while a firm's competitive position in its industry (percentage of industry sales by the firm) improves its valuation. Profitable and more efficient firms have higher valuation:
sales to assets ratio and lagged earnings are positively correlated with valuation. R&D expenditures are positively related to market value, reflecting that growth firms with higher research spending levels have a higher valuation.
2. Heckman Treatment Effect Estimation with correction for sample selection
As noted in the previous section, the sample selection problem makes the interpretation of the dual dummy coefficient problematic, as the estimate likely is biased.
The Heckman treatment effect estimation adjusts for the selection problem in two steps. In the first stage the probability of having a dual-class structure is determined in a probit regression, where a probability of having a dual-class structure is regressed on firm-and industry-specific characteristics. In order to improve the validity of the Heckman procedure, we need to have at least one valid instrument in the probit regression. The usual conditions in this case are that an instrument is sufficiently correlated with the dual class dummy and that it does not have a direct influence on the dependent variable of the second stage regression, the market-to-book value.
As discussed above, the variables firm age, dummy for a person's name, share of dual-class firms in a broadly defined industry and exogenously driven departure are selected as instruments for this step.
The Inverse Mill's Ratio (IML) is obtained in the probit regression and then substituted into the second stage regression to correct for the sample selection. We employ two specifications of the first stage estimation, (i) with firm age, dummy of person's name and share of dual-class companies in a firm's industry, 25 corresponding to two middle columns in Table 3 ; and specification (ii) where we additionally include the dummy of the period following an exogenously driven departure as an excluded instrument (the last two columns in Table 3 ).
[Insert Table 3 Here] 25 The firm itself was excluded from calculating the share of other dual-class companies in a given firm's industry.
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Column (2) of Table 3 presents the probit estimation of dual-class selection in specification (i). We observe that the dual structure is more likely in younger firms (negative relation to firm age), if a firm's name contains a person's name (although only marginally significant at a 10% level), and if the firm has more dual firms in its industry (dual share variable). Also, the R&D expense level is negatively associated with dual-class, indicating that the growth firms with higher level of R&D are generally less likely to have dual-class shares. All exogenous regressors (besides person's name dummy) are significant at least at a 10% significance level, and the Wald test of independent equations rejects the no sample selection hypothesis at all conventional significance levels.
As follows from the Heckman estimation in column (1), the selection is indeed present: the Heckman selection term, IML, is negative indicating that firms that happen to be dual-class also tend to be selected -ceteris paribus -from the pool of companies with lower valuation. A partial explanation for the negative coefficient of the selection term comes from the fact that R&D-intensive firms generally tend to have a higher equity valuation, and at the same time are less likely to have a dual structure (as follows from our probit estimation column). This result is consistent with Villanoga and Amit's (2006) findings that firms with higher Tobin's Q -i.e.
firms with more growth opportunities and less fixed assets in place -have a smaller likelihood of adopting dual-class shares. In the main regression, the dual share dummy coefficient has a causal interpretation: dual-class has a positive and significant impact on a firm value. In other words, the firms that are more likely to be in the dual-class group are ex ante inclined to be valued less, but having a dual-class structure improves their value. Other variables generally have similar signs to the OLS specification.
In specification (ii), the results stay qualitatively the same, as reported in columns (3) and (4). Here we add the PostDeparture dummy and a dummy of Departure. 26
Note that firms that experience a departure over the whole period, i.e. with the Departure dummy equal to one, are more likely to have dual shares. This is related to a higher incidence of detected departures in firms with higher concentrated control.
On the other hand, such firms are fundamentally different from firms with no influential insiders, so the Departure variable does not satisfy the exclusion requirement and thus we have to include it also in the main regression. Interestingly, it has a strong negative effect on the firm value, indicating that the pool of firms, from which we detected departures of influential insiders, are ex ante valued less, and this effect stays when the dual-class sample selection is accounting for using the IML variable.
The variables Dual Share and Post-Departure in column (4) Thus, the main result is that in Switzerland a dual-class structure provides more benefits than drawbacks to the shareholder value, so that the net influence of positive long-term commitment effect and negative deprivation of value effect is positive.
We suppose that in Switzerland it is probably a result of high degree of prudence and law-abidance that could in part be an equilibrium outcome in the economy with dominating dual-class structures and low transparency in the early 90s.
Efficiency of M&A transactions
In addition to the impact of the dual-class structure on a firm's valuation, we investigate whether growth via acquisitions has different patterns within subsamples of dual and single-class firms. The non-organic investment is an ideal setting to determine whether the net effect of long-term commitment and the private benefits problem improves the efficiency of acquisitions performed by dual-class firms relative to those performed by single-class firms. The stock market return around the acquisition announcement comes as a critical test of whether the investors believe that firm executives and majority shareholders indeed pursue a value-maximizing strategy.
According to the efficient market hypothesis, investors command their evaluation of a proposed acquisition value into the share price. If there is in fact a substantial concern that private interests are a dominating factor for the decision to acquire, the market is more likely to express its dissatisfaction by pushing the stock price down.
We start with a univariate analysis of abnormal returns to yield the first result regarding the difference in acquisitions' efficiency within the two groups of firms. We present the distribution of abnormal returns over the sample period of 1994 to 2008 in To assess the statistical significance of this trend, we split the sample period into 23 five equally spilt periods. We calculate the average returns over each period for dual and single-class firms, as well as the difference between the two groups, and report the results in Table 4 . The intuition regarding Figure 1 is confirmed statistically: the difference between single and dual-class average returns is positive in the first period and negative in the last, both at a 10% significance level.
[Insert Table 4 dual-class firms were on average better than those announced by single-class firms.
As compared to the market-to-book value results of the previous chapter, the acquisition return analysis does not suffer the problem of non-random choice into a dual versus single share category. Rather, the comparison of returns between the two groups manifests the view of the market on the quality of acquisitions. So, assuming the market provides a correct assessment of the value consequences for each acquisition, 27 the comparison of returns can demonstrate which group of firms performs more valuable acquisitions (or less value-destructive ones -if we talk about the managerial overconfidence and empire building aspects behind acquisitions).
Before drawing conclusions regarding the M&A efficiency, we need to conduct multivariate tests to account for various firm-specific characteristics that were shown to be related to acquisition returns. Market-to-book value of equity proxies the value of marginal Q and captures the relative valuation of the firm. Overvaluation of stock may lead to managerial overconfidence resulting in sub-optimal acquisitions, so we additionally interact the market-to-book variable with the dual dummy variable. Also, overvaluation creates an incentive to optimally perform stock-financed acquisitions, which are more likely to have lower announcement returns. To address this issue, we exclude all-stock financed acquisitions as a robustness check. Further, we include leverage to control for disciplining effect of debt in the capital structure, natural logarithm of assets to control for size, earnings and assets turnover to capture efficiency, and age. All accounting variables are as of the end of the year preceding the acquisition announcement. The results of CAR regressions are reported in Table 5 .
To address the change in the tendency that we observed in a univariate setting, we interact in regression (1) the dual dummy with the post-2000 dummy. Echoing our preliminary results, model (1) shows that in the first half of our sample the influence of dual-class on acquisitions is negative, although insignificant (the estimate has a p-value of about 15%); while in the second part, it is positive at a 10% significance level.
In model (2) For a firm with below-average valuations, the influence of dual-class is higher, while for firms with a market-to-book value substantially above average (in the sample we have standard deviation of the market-to-book variable equal 1.90) the effect of dual-class is negative.
The latter result has interesting cross-sectional implications: it is not the high valuation or concentrated control resulting from a dual-class structures that lead to inferior acquisition decisions, but rather the combination of both. Higher valuation may create managerial overconfidence along the lines of Malmandier and Tate (2005), while dual-class can help executives to avoid common control mechanisms and to relinquish their ambitions to acquire excessively. The alternative interpretation here would be that managers optimally acquire when the stock is overvalued, and the negative return results from the signalling effect. However, this alternative has a limited validity as the results on the sample without 100% stock-financed acquisitions (unreported for sake of brevity) are not qualitatively different.
As for the control variables, a high level of debt seems to improve the return to acquisitions due to monitoring role of bondholders that averts managers from making value-destroying acquisitions: the coefficient on Leverage is positive in both regressions, although it is marginally significant only in model (1) . Asset turnover measured by the Sales over assets variable has a positive influence on acquisition returns, although insignificant in both regressions, indicating that acquisitions by firms that utilize assets more effectively are somewhat better appreciated.
In these acquisition return regressions, we observe an isolated outcome of a managerial decision to acquire another firm or business; so as we find that market reaction is more positive in one group of firms, it indicates that interests of shareholders are better pursued in this type of firms. While we observe the resulting net influence of the dual-class structure on acquisition returns, and not the structural mechanism that makes acquisitions by dual-class firms better (in the second half of our sample period or within companies with low and moderate valuations), we can only hypothesize as to why dual-class may improve the acquisition outcomes. As mentioned in the beginning of the paper, the dual-class shares help to preclude unsolicited takeovers and while the competitive pressure on firm executives weakens, so does the fear that the firm would be acquired, particularly, following a temporary decline in the market value of a firm.
Fear to be acquired was speculated to be one of the reasons why Swiss Life an- This example, while spotting only one of numerous aspects of the decision to acquire, has its own merit in that it shows how the dual structure can improve the acquisition outcomes by shifting focus of the executives on the long-term interests.
And if the scope for the deprivation of value by insiders is limited due to a superior legal environment, as is the case in Switzerland, the net effect of the dual-class on acquisition returns becomes positive.
Conclusions
This article contributes to the extensive literature on dual-class shares and on the extraction of private benefits by corporate insiders. We argue that the net effect of the long-term commitment and potential for deprivation of value that dual-class can foster depends significantly on the level of corporate transparency and accountability, as well as on the value of reputation and repeated interactions between corporate insiders and outside investors.
By applying the sample selection techniques to our sample of Swiss firms with suitable instruments, we find that the dual-class, in fact, improves the valuation of firms, although the sample selection leads to a lower ex-ante valuation among firms that choose to deviate from the one share-one vote rule. Significance is stated as: * for at least 10% significance level, ** for 5% and *** for 1% or better. Standard errors adjusted to clustering at firm level, corresponding t-values reported in italic. Constant term, year and industry dummy coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Significance is stated as: * for at least 10% significance level, ** for 5% and *** for 1% or better. Standard errors adjusted to clustering at firm level, corresponding t-values reported in italic. Constant term, year and industry dummy coefficients are suppressed for brevity.
